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'Introduction 
One of the more striking features of financial markets in 
developing countries is their extreme degree of fragmentation, 
that results in limited access to institutional financial 
services, particularly for the rural population. Significant 
investments in technical assistance and directed credit programs 
implemented over the past decades by international donor agencies 
and developing country governments have attempted to improve the 
access of lower income groups to financial services. These 
efforts have achieved an extremely selective and short-run 
expansion in the supply of subsidized agricultural credit, as a 
result of significant delivery costs, loan delinquency, and 
internal contradictions that have undermined the financial 
viability of the intermediaries. These efforts have thus 
generally failed to stimulate the long-term, self-sustaining 
growth of these markets. 
Over the past several years, greater emphasis has been 
placed in the literature upon the deleterious effects that 
foreign aid has had on the performance of financial markets as a 
result of price distortions introduced by the external assistance 
and the heavily subsidized credit programs. This recognition has 
been reflected in a discernable shift of foreign aid programs 
from the public to the private sector in an effort to strengthen 
market forces. In the financial markets of aid recipient 
countries this policy change has resulted in the withdrawal of 
funding from specialized financial institutions (SFis), such as 
public-sector development banks and cooperatives, which had 
depended for much of their growth on access to subsidized 
external credit. Recently, the tendency has been to limit the 
explicit subsidies and to channel available credit, at "market" 
rates of interest, through private commercial and development 
banks. 
Although this shift had been partly the result of a clear-
cut emphasis on supporting the private sector in developing 
countries, it has also found ample justification in the generally 
poor performance of SFis. The evaluation of the performance of 
public-sector agricultural development banks (ADRs) and other 
specialized financial institutions has generally been quite 
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outspoken in its criticism. High levels of borrower delinquency, 
negative real rates of interest, high operating costs, and the 
use of obsolete banking technologies have been some of the 
negative aspects frequently cited in the literature.1 Although 
other financial institutions, such as savings and loan cooper-
atives (credit unions), have received much less attention, with 
few exceptions they have been facing the same diff iculties.2 
The primary focus of the operations and the SFis has been on 
the lending side, typically concentrated in one sector of the 
economy (agriculture or industry) and targeted to a specific 
segment of the population at subsidized rates of interest. The 
creation of these institutions was supported by the international 
donors and banks, as well as by the governments of developing 
countries in order to overcome actual or perceived financial 
market imperfections. Specifically, the observation of a highly 
skewed income distribution, the limited presence of private 
financial institutions in the rural areas, the restricted access 
of the majority of the population to financial services, and the 
lack of long-term finance provided the justification for these 
efforts. 
1see for example: V. V. Bhatt, "Development Banks in the 
Financial System," International J'ournal of D!!yelopment Banking 
l(J'anuary 1983) :5-10. Carlos E. Cuevas and Douglas H. Graham, 
"Agricultural Lending Costs in Honduras," in Dale W Adams et. 
al. , eds. , !!!!~ermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. J'. D. Von Pischke, "The Pitfalls 
of Specialized Farm Credit Institutions in Low-Income Countries," 
Development Digest 18(.J'uly 1980):79-91. Douglas H. Graham and 
Compton Bourne, "Agricultural Credit and Rural Progress in 
J'amaica," in J'. D. Von Pischke et. al., eds., Rural Financial 
Markets in Developing Countries, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1983, pp. 190-199. J'. D. Von Pischke, Peter J'. 
Hefferman, and Dale W Adams, "The Political Economy of 
Specialized Farm Credit Institutions in Low Income Countries," 
World Bank Staff Paper No. 446, Washington, D.C., 1981. J'effrey 
Poyo, Los Bancos Agropecuarios y la Captacion de Oepositos, Santo 
Domingo: Centro de !!!studios Monetarios y Bancarios, 1986. Carlos 
E. Cuevas and J'ef frey Poyo, Costas de Operacion y Economias de 
Escala en el Banco Agricola de la Republica Domicana, Santo 
Domingo: Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Bancarios, 1986. 
2For a discussion of some of these problems see: Jeffrey 
Poyo, "Development Without Dependence: Financial Repression and 
Deposit Mobilization Among the Rural Credit Unions in Honduras," 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, December 
1986, and Jeffrey Poyo, "Repression y Liberalizacion Financiera 
En Las Coopera ti vas De Ahorro y Credi to En La Republ ica 
Dominicana," unpublished manuscript, June 1987. 
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For the purposes of this paper, a specialized financial 
institution is defined as a financial institution, of public or 
private ownership, whose implicit objective function(s) is not 
prof it maximization. This paper will focus upon two very 
different types, both of which concentrate their operations in 
the rural areas: agricultural development banks (ADBs) and open-
membership credit unions (CUs). Important conflicts exist in 
both cases concerning the various objectives that they are 
presumed to pursue. This provides a common thread for the 
analysis. The focus upon this common dilemma provides the 
underlying conceptual base from which to explain the similar 
performance-related problems emphasized in the literature. 
The most relevant distinctions among financial institutions, 
which contribute to an understanding of the observed variations 
in operational efficiency, are not primarily a question of 
private or public ownership as generally argued. The similar-
ities in the problems faced by CUs and ADBs suggest that this is 
not the case. What is critical is their mode of operation. If 
the SFis respond primarily to market forces as a guide to their 
operations, then the question of ownership is relatively unimpor-
tant. In practice, however, market signals are ignored, and the 
institution's objectives are not clearly defined. On the 
contrary, these objectives are quite often ambiguous or con-
tradictory. 
The objective of this paper is to draw together some of the 
major lessons learned from various AID-funded projects with SFis. 
These projects have concentrated technical assistance in the area 
of deposit mobilization within institutions that have tradition-
ally offered only credit services. Specifically, the main focus 
will be the relationship between deposit mobilization, on the one 
hand, and the overall financial performance of these institutions 
on the other. This paper will analyze the extent to which 
deposit mobilization has influenced the financial viability of 
the intermediary, and whether or not this innovation tends to 
ameliorate or exacerbate the inherent conflicts within the 
institution's ambiguous objective function. 
In spite of the concerted efforts of SFis over the past 
decades, most of the conditions observed in rural financial 
markets which justified their creation are still present. The 
difficulties encountered in serving these markets, such as high 
information and transaction costs, have highlighted the reasons 
why these markets were not served by the traditional banking 
industry in the first place. It will be argued in this paper 
that with an adequate set of institutional incentives and 
appropriate technical assistance SFis can effectively expand the 
access of middle and lower income rural clientele to financial 
services, without a need for sustained subsidization. However, 
unless the important conflicts inherent in their objectives are 
recognized and taken into consideration, the technical assistance 
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programs designed to improve their performance have little chance 
of achieving their intended results. 
The first section of this paper will focus upon the diverse 
objective functions of public-sector agricultural development 
banks and their inherent contradictions. The second will 
concentrate upon the conflicting incentives for participation in 
open-membership credit unions. It will relate the resulting 
distorted incentive structure to the poor performance of these 
institutions. The third section will present arguments that 
support the contention that financial performance is signifi-
cantly related to the importance of deposit mobilization within 
the structure of the financial firm. In the next section, the 
results of the deposit mobilization efforts within the Banco 
Agricola and several credit unions in the Dominican Republic will 
be reviewed. 
The Political Economy of Public-Sector Agricultural Development 
Banks 
The public-sector SFis, such as the ADBs, have served two 
major and very different objectives for the governments of 
developing countries. The most obvious has been to provide 
financial resources in support of government policies in the 
agricultural (rural) sector. This has been done by providing 
subsidized credit to specific target groups. Second, the SFis 
have also been a mechanism to obtain access to foreign currency 
for balance of payments support at highly subsidized rates of 
interest. The traditional view of subsidized credit highlights 
its presumed role as an important instrument to solve everything 
that is wrong in the rural economy, such as a skewed distribution 
of income and low agricultural productivity and production. This 
view has provided a justification for the large volume of funds 
channeled by donor agencies to these SFis. The central banks 
have typically assumed the risk of exchange rate fluctuations. 
Donor credit projects clearly fulfill the needs of 
developing country governments. In addition, these projects have 
found support among international donor agencies, since they 
greatly facilitate the disbursement of large volumes of funds 
with relatively little administrative effort while, at the same 
time, they presumably improve the absolute income level and 
income distribution in developing countries. 
For the administrators of ADBs, however, there exist 
important conflicts among the objectives which derive from their 
dual role as managers of financial institutions, on the one hand, 
and disbursement agents for external and internally funded 
subsidized credit programs, on the other. These administrators 
also have their own implicit objective function and may thus 
attempt to maximize the size of the institution, as measured by 
loan portfolio, number of branch offices, and total assets. At 
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the same time, they have to protect the financial viability of 
the institution. As a public sector institution heavily 
dependent upon external credit, however, they are frequently 
expected to maximize the objective functions of their governments 
and of other creditors which may come into direct conflict with 
the ADB's own objectives. 
Some of these exogenous objectives may include, for example, 
the provision of subsidized production credit in order to 
maximize the short-term production of basic grains; support for 
an agrarian reform program; income transfers to the rural poor; 
the granting of incentives for crop substitution projects; and 
participation in special environmental protection programs. 
Since the ultimate goal inherent in these credit programs go far 
beyond, and may take precedence over, the basic objectives of 
financial intermediation, the possibility for conflict arises. 
These exogenous objectives may be in conflict with those of the 
ADBs in so far as they tend to undermine the real growth of the 
institution through increased borrower delinquency (because of 
the riskier target group); higher operational costs, due to 
special supervision and reporting requirements; and negative real 
rates of interest. 
Despite the close financial linkage, the relationship 
between the ADBs and their major creditors (external and inter-
nal) is a highly conflictive one. Creditors have been primarily 
concerned with the target population for whom their programs are 
designed, and have ignored the impact of limited intermediation 
margins and of costly supervisory and reporting requirements upon 
the banks. Likewise, internal controls designed to protect the 
financial viability of the ADBs (more rigorous loan analysis and 
aggressive loan recovery practices) may not be compatible with 
these externally-funded programs if, when applied, members of the 
target population are excluded from the institution's portfolio. 
This typical dilemma arises with loans to agrarian reform 
programs with poor credit records, in which loan analysis and 
collection procedures are sacrificed ''for the national interest". 
The more traditional view is that, since these institutions 
are public-sector development banks, they cannot have an 
objective separate from that of the central government and that 
their goal should be the support of programs considered to be in 
the national interest. If this argument is accepted, an analysis 
of institutional performance becomes very difficult. Such an 
evaluation should include the presumed benefits obtained by the 
target groups as a result of the institution's credit programs. 
This led to an emphasis on loan impact studies by international 
creditors. However, it soon proved difficult to determine the 
relative impact of credit on output at the farm level. At the 
same time serious questions were raised with respect to the 
ability of these subsidized credit programs to achieve their 
intended goals of improved income distribution and increased 
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agricultural productivity. More recently, attention has focused 
upon the impact of these programs on the financial viability of 
the intermediaries. 
If the major premise upon which the subsidized credit 
operations of the ADBs have been based does not hold, then 
clearly the objectives of these intermediaries must be 
reassessed. The lack of access to financial services continues 
to plague rural populations and, with the serious 
decapitalization of ADBs, these institutions are having less and 
less impact on the rural economy, as the real size of their 
portfolios declines. Because of their dependence upon external 
resources, their lending operations witness wide swings from year 
to year. This makes investment on the part of borrowers 
difficult to plan, because of the uncertainty with regard to the 
supply of credit. In addition, due to severe limitations of 
resources, the rationing by the ADBs imposes high transactions 
costs on borrowers which fall disproportionately upon small and 
medium farmers. 
The major difficulty facing low and middle income rural 
producers is not the relative price of financial services, but 
access to them at any price, due to high transaction costs and 
limited supply. The objective of these financial intermediaries 
should focus on expanding the real supply of financial services 
to the rural population, while obtaining a significant reduction 
in transaction costs. This supply should be at prices that cover 
the costs and risks for the intermediary of providing these 
services. In those cases in which the costs of operation are 
simply too high for these institutions, innovative financial 
linkages with other types of intermediaries can be devised. In 
some distant areas of limited population concentration, the ADB's 
role can be that of a financial wholesaler, while the retail 
operations can be carried out by credit unions or other similar 
types of local institutions, whose operational and information 
costs structure is more congruent with the given target 
population. 
Although institutional performance indicators such as loan 
recovery and operational costs have recently received greater 
attention from external creditors, in the past they have tended 
to play a secondary role to specific requirements of loan tar-
geting and supervision of credit programs. Each major creditor 
maintained its own relationship with the ADBs insulated from that 
of other creditors. This often led to serious contradictions 
among the various programs managed by these banks. As long as 
concern on the part of the creditors with respect to insti tu-
tional performance played a secondary role, the managers of these 
institutions lived fairly uneventful lives as disbursement 
agents. As a result of questions raised regarding their targeted 
credit programs, however, international creditors have begun to 
focus more upon intermediary performance. The increased 
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awareness of deficient performance has led to severe criticism of 
the SFis, but sufficient consideration has not been given to the 
serious conflicts that face the administrators of these banks. 
Technical assistance programs designed to improve the 
efficiency of intermediaries will not fulfill their intended 
goals unless they take into consideration the conflicting 
objectives facing ADBs. The problems of financial performance 
that face these intermediaries and their potential solution are 
subtle and will require more than the simple stipulation by 
donors of loan delinquency and administrative cost targets. 
Political Economy of Open Membership Rural Credit Unions 
According to the literature, two different groups have been 
assumed to define the optimization problem for the financial 
intermediation firm: the owners of the institution or the firm's 
management. 3 Where firms are assumed to maximize profits, 
stockholder's utility (homogeneous for all stockholders) is a 
function of the expected capital gains and dividend distribution. 
In the case of the CUs, where the owners are the sole clients, 
their utility function is not only affected by dividend payments 
at year end, but also by the institution's interest-rate 
structure, transaction costs, collateral requirements, and the 
other dimensions of loan and deposit contracts that reflect the 
quality of the financial services received by clients. Since 
their shares cannot appreciate in face value, they benefit only 
through the distribution of prof its and the value of those 
services. 
Financial services are generally provided through individual 
initiatives and thus collective or group action is not required. 
However, when these services are provided through a cooperative, 
collective action on the part of CU members is indispensable for 
its administration. Despite the fact that there is a common 
objective among CU members, namely, to protect the cooperative's 
financial viability with an efficient administration, it does not 
follow, however, that they will voluntarily participate in this 
effort. As a result, these financial ins ti tut ions wi 11 supply 
less than optimal levels of internal administrative control, loan 
recover, and promotional and educational efforts. 
Olson points out that in a mutual organization such as a 
credit union, since the attainment of group objectives implies 
that a collective or public good has been provided, and since 
none of the members can be excluded from the potential benefits, 
there are no incentives to contribute to the common effort. 
3Anthony M. 
Survey", Journal 
1984) :576-602. 
Santomero, "Modeling the Banking Firm: A 
of Money, Credit, and Banking. 16 (November 
8 
Unless the membership is small, or unless there is coercion or 
positive inducement to act in the common interest, "rational 
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common 
or group interests".4 
CUs are unique in that they are privately-owned financial 
institutions whose members are at one time owners and sole 
clients. Unlike other forms of mutual organizations, CUs are 
proscribed from providing financial services to anyone besides 
their members. The entire supply of deposits and demand for 
loans comes from their owner-clients. The fact that CU members 
carry our financial transactions on both sides of the market, as 
depositors and borrowers, introduces interesting complications 
into the analysis. Most policy decisions are inherently 
conflictive since they carrs important income redistribution 
consequences among the owners. 
In a highly competitive financial market, the financial 
policies of the CUs may not depart significantly from those of a 
typical profit maximizing firm. In a developing country where 
financial markets are characterized by an extreme degree of 
fragmentation and significant transaction costs, access to credit 
and deposit services may be more important in the member's. 
utility function than the potentially higher dividends achieved 
through profit maximization. Most importantly, the utility of 
all members cannot be represented by a single homogeneous utility 
function, since the utility of members who are primarily 
depositors is positively correlated with the interest paid on 
deposits, implying high loan rates, while the borrowers' utility 
is negatively correlated with high rates of interest on loans. 
Although credit unions were originally conceived as 
"complete" financial intermediaries that offer both deposit and 
credit services, the cooperative philosophy that has tradi-
tionally influenced their operations has focused primarily upon 
high cost of credit in informal financial markets as the raison 
d'etre of the credit union's existence. Rigid pricing policies 
in nominal terms and access to highly subsidized external credit, 
in the presence of domestic inflation, has distorted the internal 
incentives for CU member participation which ultimately 
determines membership composition. CUs that have had access to 
externally subsidized credit have designed their growth 
4Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 2. 
5see Mark J. Flannery, "An Economic Evaluation of Credit 
Unions in the United States," Research Report, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, 1974, and Ryland A. Taylor, "The Credit Union as 
a Cooperative Institution, 11 Review of Social Economy. 29 
(September 1971):207-212. 
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strategies around the promotion of "low cost" credit to the 
detriment of deposit services. Under this set of incentives, 
which penalizes net savers and rewards net debtors, the vast 
majority of the members join the CU with the expectation of 
obtaining a loan. Though many of these individuals could 
probably be net savers in their relationships with other 
financial ins ti tut ions, their reason for joining the CU is the 
expectation of gaining access to flows of subsidized credit. The 
pricing and growth strategies followed by these institutions have 
not only severely limited opportunities for domestic financial 
savings mobilization, but have also resulted in "borrower-
domina ted" financial ins ti tut ions open to serious problems of 
moral hazard and risk exposure in their administration. 
In addition to the underlying problems of eliciting active 
participation in the administration of mutual organizations, 
other contradictions exist. Given their conflicting objectives 
as clients and owners and borrowers and depositors, the policies 
that maximize the members' short-term goals may take precedence 
over policies necessary for the long-term financial health of the 
institution. For example, member-borrowers at any point in time, 
whether delinquent or not, clearly do not have a personal 
interest in participating in any collective effort to tighten 
loan evaluation and loan recovery procedures since rigorous 
administrative controls and more severe sanctions applied to 
improve collection efficiency will affect their interest as 
clients. 
A CU that is successful at mobilizing voluntary savings 
deposits not directly tied to the expectation of obtaining a loan 
will attract individuals whose interest in the institution is 
pr imar i 1 y for depository services. Though an expectation of 
access to credit influences their selection of financial 
institutions, of greater importance will be the effective rate of 
return on their deposits, the level of transaction costs, and the 
general quality of the service offered. Their interests are not 
the same as those of individuals who join the institution 
primarily to gain access to subsidized credit. For this reason, 
this group of members (net savers) is likely to bring pressure on 
the institution to ameliorate the problems of moral hazard 
prevalent in borrower-dominated CUs. 
With the participation of net depositors, the financial 
intermediation by CUs will begin to take on characteristics of a 
zero-sum game in which the implicit subsidy received by 
defaulting borrowers would be charged to other members in the 
institution, as opposed to an external creditor. Those members 
who perceive the greatest potential loss from high levels of 
borrower delinquency will be more prepared to incur the 
opportunity costs of time and effort to attain the collective 
good of improved loan administration. Efforts on the part of 
external creditors to improve the loan collection and operational 
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efficiency of CUs, which emphasize more loan supervision, higher 
collateral, or greater sanctions for delinquency, will only 
increase the costs of their credit delivery programs without 
achieving the intended results. Unless the essential elements of 
moral hazard and conflicting objectives are adequately 
recognized, greater credit restrictions will succeed only in 
rationing credit away from those groups within the rural 
population for whom these programs are designed. 
Deposit Mobilization and Performance in SFis 
As a result of their financial dependence on a small number 
of foreign and domestic lending ins ti tut ions, the services 
offered by and the administrative structure of SFis have 
reflected the implicit objectives of their creditors. In a study 
of the functional distribution of the costs of an agricultural 
development bank in Honduras, for example, an unusually high 
concentration on the lending side was observed. This 
distribution was found to be diametrically opposed to that 
observed for financial intermediaries that depended primarily 
upon the domestic money and capital markets as their source for 
loanable funds. 6 This administrative structure of the ADB 
clearly reflected the objectives of its creditors, (i.e., 
international donors), whose concerns were limited to credit 
deli very, rather than resource mo bi l iza t ion or institutional 
development. Because deposits were not contemplated within the 
utility function of the donors, they were not considered to be an 
important service from which the rural population can derive 
significant benefits. In fact, as a result of the creditor's own 
institutional objectives, significant financial disincentives for 
domestic deposit mobilization have been an integral element in 
the design of these traditional credit programs. 
The neglect of deposit services has been the result of three 
interdependent factors. In contrast to credit, which has always 
been justified from a social cost/benefit perspective, deposit 
services have usually been evaluated from an institutional or 
private cost/benefit viewpoint. Second, it has been a widely-
held belief that the effective demand for deposit services would 
be limited due to the relatively low income levels of the rural 
population and their presumed inability to save. Further, it has 
been argued that even if financial resources could be mobilized 
from the public, since the interest paid on deposits would have 
to be competitive with local financial markets, this higher 
financial cost would necessarily have to be passed on to the 
6 This administrative emphasis on lending can be observed 
with an analysis of functional cost structure. See Carlos Cuevas 
and Douglas H. Graham, "Agricultural Lending Costs in Honduras" 
in Dale W Adams et al. Undermining Rural Development with Cheap 
Credit, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. 
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borrowing cl ientele. The assumption that the majority of SFI 
clients are unable to pay higher loan rates of interest made 
deposit mobilization an unattractive alternative. 
This approach has overlooked two important considerations. 
First, deposit services have a positive impact on individual 
welfare by satisfying a store of wealth and transactions 
function. This is particularly valuable, considering the highly 
specialized nature of the rural economy, where income flows are 
subject to wide annual fluctuations. In addition, through the 
growth in volume and breadth of rural financial intermediation, 
deposit mobilization contributes to an expanded supply of 
loanable funds available to a greater proportion of the 
population. Under inflationary conditions, however, the real 
rates of interest paid on deposits remain consistently negative 
and individual welfare is improved only by the value of 
transaction balances. This is clearly not the case when interest 
rates are positive in real terms. Because of the effect that 
asset diversification has on total returns, access to low 
transaction costs, highly liquid, and secure financial 
instruments which provide a positive rate of return may represent 
the most cost-effective method of achieving greater stability in 
rural incomes. 
Second, competitive pressures within financial markets, 
which in these institutions are introduced exclusively on the 
deposit side, make the institution's administrators more 
conscious of their financial margins, and operational costs. 
While ignoring the significantly positive impact of competition 
in domestic money and capital markets on institutional 
development, the SFis have been relegated to financial dependence 
and institutional inefficiency and fragility. These are hardly 
optimal characteristics for institutions which are expected to 
provide financial services to the most costly and risky 
clientele, which requires the development of innovative 
approaches in order to effectively reach this clientele. The 
failure to develop the mechanisms for domestic deposit 
mobilization within SFis has not only had a negative impact on 
institutional development, but also on the growth of rural 
incomes. 
The two most important elements inherent in domestic deposit 
mobilization which have a significant impact on institutional 
development are, first, the redistribution of the risks of 
financial intermediation towards the SFI and risk 
decentralization within the institution and, second, the pricing 
of resources more in keeping with local opportunity costs. The 
reassignment of risk bearing towards the SFI will tend to reduce 
the problem of moral hazard and loan delinquency inherent in 
their lending operations. When their clients participate only on 
one side of the market, there are no elements of a zero-sum game 
and financial intermediation is conducted between external 
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"savers" (creditors) and the ins ti tut ion's clients (borrowers). 
If, in addition, future access to these "savings'' is believed to 
be independent of institutional performance as a result of 
signals from the creditors, then financial administration will 
deteriorate. Likewise, if the price (explicit interest cost and 
administrative risk) of the loanable funds is too low, the 
managers of the institution will have no incentive to use them 
efficiently. The next section will investigate the relationship 
between the performance of a particular SFI and the introduction 
of deposit mobilization. It will focus on the possible obstacles 
and imbalances created by the introduction of this new service. 
Deposit Mobilization and the Agricultural Bank of the Dominican 
Republic. 
The Banco Agricola is a public-sector bank whose portfolio 
is predominantly composed of short-term credit highly 
concentrated in financing rice production. The bank has over 30 
branch off ices distributed throughout the rural area. This 
represents the widest geographical coverage of any financial 
institution in the country. Until recently, however, the only 
service provided was credit. The growth in the bank's portfolio 
over the past 16 years can be divided into three distinct sub-
periods: 1970-78, 1979-82, and 1982-86. Throughout the first 
period, the bank's portfolio grew at an average annual rate of 11 
percent in nominal terms. Subsequently, in response to the 
devastating effects of Hurricane Frederick, the portfolio 
expanded at an annual rate of over 22 percent between 1979 and 
1981. It slowed in the last period to an average of only 2. 6 
percent per annum in current pesos. 
Chart 1 in Appendix I shows that between 1970 and 1978, 
despite a relatively low inflation rate, the bank's loan 
portfolio in constant 1980 pesos did not grow. During the second 
period from 1979 to 1982, however, it expanded by about 33 
percent in real terms. Finally, during the last period the real 
value of the bank's portfolio declined by about 48 percent. In 
Chart 2 the unusual rate of growth in loan disbursement (as a 
result of the hurricane) is clearly evident. This rate returned 
in the last period to the trend line established between 1970-
1978. By 1986, annual disbursements in constant 1980 pesos were 
about equivalent to what they had been in 1973 and the real loan 
portfolio reached its lowest level for the entire period. 
It is interesting to note in Chart 3 the extremely wide 
fluctuations observed in the growth of annual real loan 
disbursements, which to a large extent is a reflection of the 
institution's dependence upon sources of funds captive of 
external and internal bureaucratic decision-making. From a 
negative growth of 5.2 percent in 1971, disbursements in real 
terms grew at an annual rate of almost 30 percent 3 years later, 
declining again to negative growth by 1977. After real growth 
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rates of over 23 and 24 percent in 1978 and 1979, growth fell to 
minus 25 percent in 1981. 
The seriousness of the decapitalization process can be 
confirmed in Chart 4, which presents the number of hectares 
financed with annual loan disbursements. The number of hectares 
financed rose from 112,000 in 1970 to about 254,000 by 1980, but 
fell dramatically between 1980 and 1986 and reached a level of 
less than 75,000 hectares during this last year. With the 
decline in annual disbursements, from its peak of 153 million 
pesos attained in 1980 to a value of less than half this by 1986 
(in 1980 pesos), exacerbated by the international debt crisis and 
the limited access to external credit, the bank turned to deposit 
mobilization as a new institutional strategy to stem the 
financial decline it experienced since 1981. 
After over a year of discussion and preparation, the bank in 
mid-1984 offered its clients, on a voluntary basis, access to 
both passbook savings accounts and time deposits. Financial 
certificates were offered in 1987. The rates of interest paid on 
savings accounts and time deposits have been controlled by the 
Central Bank at levels below the rate of inflation. Banco 
Agricola obtained preferential treatment with regard to the 
reserve requirement, which was set at 10 percent vis-a-vis 30 
percent for commercial banks. In addition to the differential 
reserve requirement, the bank entered the rural market with a 
slight advantage vis-a-vis the commercial banks considering 
geographic location and interest rates. The bank has been 
authorized to pay up to 6 percent on savings accounts, 10 percent 
on time deposits, and 16 percent on financial certificates. Each 
rate is slightly above what commercial banks can pay. 
Although the initial intention was to limit deposit 
mobilization to 4 or 5 branch offices for the first two years, 
the bank quickly expanded the service to all offices. Given the 
existence of the generally underutilized physical infrastructure 
and personnel, there were important unused scale and scope 
economies available for the provision of this service. After 
three years of operations, the bank had mobilized a total of 
56,784 accounts and deposits with a total volume of 15.5 million 
pesos (4.8 million U.S. dollars; see Chart 5). By June 1987, 
almost three quarters of the funds mobilized came from passbook 
savings accounts with 13 and 12 percent from time deposits and 
financial certificates, respectively. 
Although the bank has been successful in mobilizing a 
significant volume of resources through its deposit services, 
primarily with passbook savings accounts, the most serious 
obstacles in this effort have been the high transaction costs 
faced by their clientele because of the small size of their 
accounts and the bank's limited ability to remain competitive in 
rapidly changing financial markets. Chart 7 shows that the 
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volume mobilized through time deposits began to decline from 
September 1985. This disintermediation was the result of changes 
in Central Bank regulations that affected the relative 
competitiveness of this instrument vis-a-vis the financial 
certificates. 
Because of the high minimum deposit required and the 
relatively high rate of interest paid (RD$100,000 at 14 percent 
per annum), the bank did not utilize financial certificates in 
the early months. However, seven months after the operations 
began the Monetary Board reduced the minimum deposit on financial 
certificates to one tenth of what it had been, and allowed the 
interest rate to be determined by bank competition ranging in a 
wide band from 9. 5 to 19 percent per annum. 7 Given the 
relatively high inflationary expectations and the competition 
from the non-regulated financial markets, the interest paid on 
these certificates rapidly reached the ceiling. These 
certificates began to compete in the same segment of the market 
with time deposits and similar instruments of lower denomination 
utilized by other institutions, that paid almost double the rate 
permitted on these instruments. The impact of this regulatory 
change on the majority of institutions was an increase in their 
cost of funds as financial certificates substituted other 
instruments upon maturity. For Banco Agricola which could not 
offer the certificate, this resulted in financial 
disintermediation. 
Al though the administrators of the bank were warned about 
the impending danger to their savings mobilization program if 
they did not obtain authorization to offer the financial 
certificates, the decision to do so was delayed for a year and a 
half. This delay was due to the expectation of receiving a large 
injection of funds from one of their major external creditors, 
which would have allowed them to avoid the difficult decision. 
Since the interest paid by the competition on these financial 
certificates had reached (and surpassed in some cases), the legal 
ceiling, which in turn was equal to the highest rate charged by 
the bank on its loans, the decision to utilize this instrument 
was preceded by very serious debate within the bank. 
In addition to maintaining the competitiveness of its 
deposit services, another constant preoccupation has been the 
bank's ability to lend out the funds mobilized rapidly enough to 
maintain profitability, given the much thinner interest-rate 
margin available on these funds. Chart 8 presents the percentage 
of disposable deposit funds (net of reserve requirements) loaned 
out over the three years. As can be seen, this percentage has 
fluctuated between 50 and 80 percent, although the bank has faced 
1 Subsequently, the maximum was reduced to 16 percent per 
annum on the financial certificate. 
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a substantial excess demand for credit. There are two factors 
which account for this apparent contradiction. First, there has 
been extreme caution on the part of the bank's Board of 
Directors, as witnessed by very restrictive guidelines for 
lending these resources in the initial stages. Second, 
bureaucratic delays have resulted from credit approval and 
disbursement practices developed after many years of channeling 
subsidized external credit. These practices were incompatible 
with the efficient intermediation required for a savings 
mobilization program. 
Despite the fact that the program has only been operating 
for a few years and the volume of resources mobilized relative to 
the size of the bank is still small, this program has made a 
contribution to reduce the excess demand for credit faced by the 
bank. The shift in risk bearing from the Dominican government to 
the bank represents a significant departure from past practices 
and an important challenge to the bank's administrators and 
managers. This program more than any other has had a significant 
impact on the institutional culture in which the traditional 
operating procedures and objectives are increasingly being 
questioned. As deposits become more important as a source of 
funding, the inherent conflicts within the institution's diverse 
objective functions will have to be addressed. 
The success this new service can have in resolving some of 
these conflicts depends upon whether deposit mobilization is 
viewed as a short-term stop-gap measure, or as a long-term 
institutional strategy. It is not coincidental that after 40 
years of operations, the decision to institute this service was 
made at the time when access to subsidized external credit had 
disappeared, and the bank was faced with serious decapitalization 
and a significant excess demand for credit. The future of 
deposit mobilization as an important factor in the bank's overall 
growth strategy will very likely depend less upon the bank's own 
administrators and more upon the decisions and signals of its 
major creditors. 
Deposit mobilization is in direct conflict with the bank's 
traditional supply-leading mode of operation. As a result some 
elements of its institutional culture have become obstacles for 
the effective implementation of this new service. When the only 
service provided was credit, for which the bank faced perennial 
excess demand, employee performance incentives, infrastructure, 
image, service to clientele (transaction costs), and marketing 
were of little relevance. With the introduction of deposit 
services, the Bank now is placed in the position of having to 
"sell" its services. 
Operational inefficiencies in information management, for 
example, have become magnified with the implementation of deposit 
services because the requirements in this area are much more 
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acute than in the case of credit services alone. The need for 
accurate and timely information is vital for such operations as 
monthly interest calculations (57,000 accounts), inter-office 
withdrawals, and reserve requirement monitoring. Before the 
introduction of deposit services, liquidity management for branch 
level managers was limited to projecting expected demand (always 
greater than supply) and requesting funds from the central off ice 
when this demand became effective in the form of loan 
applications. Once deposit mobilization was introduced, however, 
the branch manager must be transformed from a passive 
disbursement agent into an active and even aggressive financial 
manager. With a new, independent, and less predictable source of 
funding, the branch manager must adequately balance the flow of 
deposits and the liquidity needs of his depositors with the 
demand for loans. Deposit mobilization presents new challenges 
to these managers in terms of liquidity and reserve management, 
and control of overhead and interest margins which they had never 
confronted in the past. Under these conditions, it is not 
surprising to note that some branch managers have resisted the 
introduction of deposit services. 
With the delegation of greater responsibility to the branch 
level as a result of of deposit mobilization, the managers of 
Banco Agricola branches displayed clear signs of risk aversion. 
In large part the extremely low delinquency rates observed in the 
portfolio financed with deposits has been the result of more 
careful borrower selection, since one of the restrictions of the 
program was that only the best clients could borrow these funds. 
Obviously this process of client selection reduces the average 
riskiness of the loans made with local deposits and increases the 
risk associated with those who borrow from the bank's other 
sources of funds. It would not be surprising to find lower than 
average delinquency rates in the portfolio of own funds and 
higher than average delinquency in the portfolio of other funds. 
The reduction in moral hazard on the part of branch managers 
as a result of their assuming a greater proportion of the risk is 
desirable, because it will reduce an unnecessary source of 
delinquency and default by borrowers whose ability to pay is 
overshadowed by their desire to take advantage of the bank's 
paternalistic behavior. Deposit mobilization in and of itself, 
however, will not resolve the .essential problem of the long-term, 
stable access to financial services for the more costly and risky 
borrowers (small farmers), unless access to these resources is 
made a function of past repayment history and not simply a 
function of the borrowers ability to provide loan guarantees. 
Al though there is a clear need to reduce the excessive risk 
taking of the past, it is clear that in the same way as 
paternalistic attitudes lead to problems of moral hazard, the 
lack of certain guarantees for the financial intermediary may 
lead to an excessive degree of risk aversion. 
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Only when the bank earns a wide enough financial margin so 
that it can cover the greater risks and costs of servicing more 
risky borrowers and only if the bank remains accountable for loan 
recovery, and if the borrowers are given a clear signal that 
access to the resources mobilized will be is a function of an 
acceptable credit history with the bank, then deposit 
mobilization will succeed in improving the long-term access to 
credit for the small and medium borrowers. There may be some 
groups of clients, however, that the Bank cannot service, given 
its relatively high cost structure. In these cases the bank can 
enter into financial arrangements with local intermediaries and 
serve as a financial wholesaler. The next section will present 
the results of a similar program with credit unions. This 
experience suggests some interesting conclusions with respect to 
the CUs comparative advantage in serving a clientele which may be 
too costly and risky for banks. 
Deposit Mobilization Among Rural Credit Unions 
The rural population in the Dominican Republic faces severe 
obstacles in obtaining access to the services of formal financial 
institutions. In the case of the private banks, the high costs 
and risks of serving this population have limited their expansion 
into these markets. In contrast, credit unions have a 
significant comparative advantage in serving a rural clientele 
because of their lower administrative costs and access to local 
information. In addition, the lack of competition in these 
markets offered the CUs a very good opportunity to expand their 
operations with a significant degree of flexibility. The 
Dominican Republic credit union movement is among the oldest in 
Latin America, but it is most likely the weakest set of 
institutions of their kind in the region. Their lack of 
experience in deposit mobilization and general administration 
made the implementation of a project with these institutions an 
extremely difficult and risky endeavor. 
The Dominican Republic credit unions, as in most of Latin 
America, are not considered part of the national banking system 
and therefore are not subject to the banking law and regulations. 
Aside from a general usury law which is universally ignored in 
all financial transactions, the only significant regulation that 
limits the operations of CUs is a ceiling on dividends paid on 
member shares, stipulated in the Cooperative Law at 5 percent per 
annum. It is quite curious (and fortunate) that, while in most 
of the CU literature the high cost of credit is generally 
described as the primary problem, the law places a ceiling on 
dividend rates, but not a ceiling on loan rates. Loan rates are 
left for each cooperative to set in their respective by-laws. 
Historically, since most CUs in the Dominican Republic have not 
used liability instruments other than share accounts, deposit 
rates have not been considered in the cooperative law or in the 
individual CU by-laws. Therefore, with the sole exception of 
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share accounts, CUs have complete freedom to establish their 
pricing structure in congruence with their institutional 
objectives. 
The primary objective of working with these cooperatives was 
to study the possi bi 1 i ty of expanding rural financial services 
through using domestic deposit mobilization as the basic strategy 
for growth and development. During the first year, four CUs were 
provided with intensive technical assistance with primary 
emphasis on financial administration. The most important thrust 
of the assistance was to lay the groundwork for significant 
changes required in operational and administrative structure. 
Technical assistance was also provided in the areas of basic 
accounting, interest rate policies, asset (credit analysis, 
delinquency control) and liability management, marketing, and 
general analysis of the economic environment. The final decision 
to carry out the policy reforms, as well as the extent of the 
changes, was taken independently by each CU's board of directors 
by the end of 1984. Beginning in 1985 all four institutions were 
mobilizing deposits from current members and attracting a 
significant number of new members as a result of the introduction 
of two competitively priced liability instruments: passbook 
savings accounts and time deposits. The passbook accounts 
differed from the traditional share accounts in that they are 
completely liquid, pay a much higher rate of interest, and are 
not tied in any explicit way to credit services. Because each CU 
made its decisions independently from the others, a wide range of 
interest rate structures can be observed. 
In three of the four credit unions, a full-time staff had to 
be hired as only part-time managers were the norm. In addition, 
some limited investments in physical infrastructure were carried 
out in all institutions. In order to cover these increased costs 
and investments, a temporary operational subsidy was provided to 
be phased out after two years. The boards of directors of all 
credit unions were conscious of the temporary nature of this 
subsidy, and that ultimately their survival depended on their 
ability to become profitable financial institutions. The major 
thrust behind the institutional reforms was to raise the interest 
rate structure to "market" levels, and to widen the operating 
margins in order to counteract rising inflationary expectations 
and cover operating costs and lending risks. In general, the 
interest-rate structure observed in the non-regulated markets, 
which represented the closest indicator to market rates, was used 
as a guide to establish interest rates in these institutions. 
Despite the fact that the nominal rates of interest on loans 
were doubled in some CUs, the effective rates in fact remained 
constant or may have even declined. The reason for this apparent 
contradiction was that the CUs require share accounts as 
compensating deposits. These accounts earn a maximum of 5 
percent per annum (if there are year-end profits to distribute). 
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Because of severe liquidity problems, in the past it was not 
uncommon to find that the required balances in share accounts 
amounted to 50 percent and 67 percent of the value of the loan. 
This had an obvious impact on the cost of the net funds obtained. 
The payment of competitive deposit rates of interest, 
significantly expanded the supply of loanable funds in the CUs 
and permitted an increase in the leverage ratios from 1. 5: 1 or 
2:1 to a maximum of 10:1, depending upon the borrower's ability 
to pay. 
The charts in Appendix II illustrate the development of the 
four CUs that participated in the project. Chart 1 presents the 
loan portfolio of each CU in current and constant pesos. In all 
cases the growth in loan portfolio was significantly greater in 
1984 than in other years because of the operational and 
administrative reforms. The real supply of credit in all CUs at 
the time of implementation was at best stagnant, and in some 
serious decapitalization was evident. In spite of a rise in the 
inflation rate in 1985 to almost 38 percent, every institution 
was able to expand the real supply of credit to its membership. 
As demonstrated in Chart 2, this growth was made possible due to 
the savings mobilization efforts, as a result of a combination of 
paying relatively high rates of interest and reducing transaction 
costs for depositors.a 
The interest-rate reforms and the effect on the financial 
margin can be observed in Charts 3 and 4. Some of the CUs 
increased their interest rates more than others, and those that 
did not raise them sufficiently encountered difficulties in 
mobilizing savings. Despite the recommendations, the Santa Lucia 
credit union paid 12 percent per annum on passbook accounts and 
13 percent on 12-month time deposits. As a result, it did not 
mobilize any time deposits until 1986 when the interest rate was 
raised to 18 percent. Chart 4 shows that in all cases the 
financial margin between loan rates and the cost of funds 
(including share accounts) rose significantly. The increase in 
the financial margins was necessary in order for the CUs to reach 
their break-even point at a relatively small size. Even if these 
margins were to translate into profits, however, they will be 
distributed to their owner-clients at the end of the year as the 
CUs grow in size. Profit retention is the only avenue open to 
capitalize the CUs, since share accounts, although referred to as 
8 Transaction costs in these institutions were quite 
significant. For example, the credit unions typically would not 
maintain cash on hand and would give their members checks drawn 
on a local bank which would then have to be cashed. 
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"social capital'', are not capital from a strictly financial point 
of view, but simply anther liability instrument.9 
The average operating costs shown in Chart 5 reflect a very 
different development in each institution. For example, in La 
Vega the operating costs increased during the first year and then 
declined as the growth of their assets outstripped the growth in 
their costs (7.8%, 9.9%, and 8.7%, respectively, between 1984 and 
1986). In 1983/84 San Jose's average costs stood at 3.6% and 
then experienced a decline in 1984/85 to 3.5% and a slight rise 
in 1985/86 to 3.7%. Because of its smaller size, Vallejuelo 
shows the highest costs. Before the project, this CU had only 
one part-time employee, while two years later it had four full-
time staff. Its operating costs in relation to its average 
assets over this period rose from 7. 7 to 19. 8 percent. In the 
case of Santa Lucia, despite a ten-fold increase in its yearly 
operating costs between 1983 and 1986, these costs declined from 
15.7% in 1984 to 8.8% in 1986 as a proportion of average assets. 
Despite the cost increase, as can be observed in Chart 6, the 
return on member's shares increased in all cases. 
The most interesting development in three of the four 
institutions has been a significant reduction in borrower 
delinquency. The San Jose credit union has been an exception to 
this rule because its delinquency has consistently been below 5 
percent. Before the introduction of this project, delinquency 
control was non-existent. When a delinquency analysis was 
carried out in each of the three institutions, it was above 50 
percent. Major improvements have been obtained and only in one 
of them does it still reach 16 percent, while in the other two it 
is below 10 percent. The decline in this ratio is partly the 
result of growth in the loan portfolio, but the delinquency among 
the loans made after the implementation of the project is very 
limited. These results reflect a significant change in attitudes 
towards loan delinquency and control which is in part the result 
of the decline in moral hazard problems within these 
institutions. 10 
The institutional performance of all four CUs improved 
significantly with the implementation of this project, clearly 
benef itting the membership though an expanded and more stable 
supply of financial services. The significant membership growth 
9Although partial withdrawals of share accounts are not 
permitted, members effectively withdraw their investment in these 
ins ti tut ions through "automatic" loans: loans equal to the 
balance in their share accounts. In fact very high delinquency 
rates are a reflection of membership desertion. 
lOThe average maturity of the portfolios is between 12 and 
18 months. 
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in the institutions implies that they are servicing an important 
need in the communities where they are located. Increased 
financial margins have improved their financial stability making 
them more capable of assuming greater risks, and in so doing 
reaching a greater proportion of the low and middle income 
population. With the apparent fall in the Dominican Republic 
inflation rate in 1986, there have been some pressures to reduce 
interest rates in the economy. They should be revised downward 
if inflationary pressures subside. However, in 1987 there was a 
significant rekindling of inflation and probably the interest 
rate structure in most of these CUs has turned negative again. 
Conclusions 
The conflicting objectives of specialized financial 
institutions and their isolation from competitive market forces 
resulting from their excessive external financial dependence has 
created extremely weak financial intermediaries. In the case of 
the ADB, the conflicting objectives of their creditors and 
financial dependence creates an extremely centralized adminis-
trative structure in which the assignment of responsibility and 
therefore effective management evaluation is often difficult if 
not impossible to implement. Likewise in the case of CUs in 
which internal conflicts of interests result from biased 
incentives for participation which creates a borrower-dominated 
institution, serious problems of moral hazard undermine their 
financial viability. 
Deposit mobilization has typically not been considered 
within the social welfare function of the external creditors of 
the SFis, and as a result deposits have typically been neglected. 
Deposit mobilization tends to transfer the risks of financial 
intermediation towards the SFis and promotes administrative 
decentralization. In the case of the ADBs the branch off ices 
gain access to an independent source of funding which not only 
provides some degree of independence from the main off ice, but 
also transfers risk-taking to the branch office. Although the 
reassignment of risk-taking to the local level may tend to 
improve administrative efficiency, the financial margins provided 
must be sufficient to cover the risks and costs of providing 
rural financial services. 
The reform of financial policies within the rural CUs to 
promote the mobilization of savings deposits through relatively 
high rates of interest and low transactions costs, substantially 
modifies the incentives for member participation. Net savers are 
attracted to the institution whose incentive to participate in 
effective administration is greater. This restructuring of 
institutional incentives tends to reduce borrower domination, and 
reduces the serious problems of moral hazard within the 
institution by introducing some elements of a zero-sum game. 
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The introduction of deposit services which provide an 
attractive combination of security and return (adjusted for 
transaction costs) to the depositor in communities that 
previously did not have access to these services can become a 
important instrument not only to slow the drain of resources from 
rural areas, but there is some evidence that the flow can be 
.reversed. In a perfectly functioning financial market, the 
transfer of resources from the rural to the urban sectors would 
reflect the underlying profitability of the activities in each 
sectors. However, within the financial markets of the LICs, 
these flows reflect the underlying fragmentation rather than 
relative profitability. In Vallejuelo, for instance, the savings 
mobilized would probably not have entered the financial markets, 
or they would have been transferred ~out of the local community. 
In this community local moneylenders have become important 
depositors, and the CU has been able to mobilize deposits from 
other towns and as far away as the capital city. Al though 
deposit mobilization has the potential of improving the financial 
viability by increasing financial independence and by 
transferring the risk-taking function to the local level, access 
to external resources will continue to be an important complement 
for the locally mobilized deposits. 
The degree to which the SFis administrative efficiency can 
be improved, depends on the importance of deposit mobilization 
within their financial structure, and restructuring the financial 
relationships with their traditional creditors so they do not 
undermine incentives for domestic resource mobilization. The 
transfer of risk-taking in financial intermediation away from the 
local level, that takes place with government guarantees and 
subsidized credit programs from international donor agencies, 
works at cross purposes with the incentives and signals provided 
through the mobilization of deposits at the local level. 
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